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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Andrew Hubbard appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After being convicted in California of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a 
child under fourteen, Hubbard became subject to sex offender registration 
requirements. (PSI, pp.5-7); see I.C. § 18-8307. In April 2011, Hubbard 
absconded from his California parole and traveled to Idaho. (PSI, p.9.) In June 
2011, California authorities informed Idaho authorities about Hubbard's active 
felony warrant and possible presence in Idaho. (PSI, p.2.) Idaho police officers 
located and arrested Hubbard. (Id.) A record check revealed that Hubbard had 
not complied with the sex offender registration requirement in Idaho. (Id.) 
The state charged Hubbard with failure to register as a sex offender. (R., 
pp.18-19.) Hubbard pied guilty. (R., pp.26-33; Tr., p.11, L.3 - p.17, L.13.) The 
district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with five years fixed, to run 
consecutive to any other sentence Hubbard was currently serving. (R., pp.38-
41.) The court later denied Hubbard's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence. (R., pp.45-49.) Hubbard timely appealed from the judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.50-52.) 
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ISSUES 
Hubbard states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's right to be 
free from double jeopardy when it imposed a sentence in 
this case premised on the belief that California had been too 
lenient in its initial sentencing on the underlying offense. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by focusing 
intently and almost exclusively on Mr. Hubbard's other 
offenses for which he had already been punished instead of 
the facts of the charge at issue when it imposed a sentence 
in the case before it. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
redline the unreliable and erroneous statements regarding 
Mr. Hubbard's criminal history from the PSI. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did Hubbard fail to preserve his claim that the district court's sentence is 
illegal? 
2. Has Hubbard failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
3. Has Hubbard failed to preserve his claim that the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to redline certain portions of his PSI? 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Hubbard Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court's Sentence Is 
Illegal 
Introduction 
Hubbard contends the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by 
imposing a sentence in his failure to register case that essentially punished him 
for his prior lewd conduct charge for which he had already been sentenced. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Hubbard's claim fails because he failed to preserve 
his argument that the district court imposed an illegal sentence. Further, 
Hubbard has failed to establish fundamental error. 
B. Hubbard Failed To Preserve His Illegal Sentence Claim 
The double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and 
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 
370, 256 P.3d 776, 778 (2011 ). Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows the trial court to 
correct an illegal sentence at any time, on the motion of either party, and either 
party may appeal from the trial court's ruling. I.C.R. 35; State v. Hernandez, 
122 Idaho 227, 229, 832 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 1992). A double jeopardy 
claim asserting that a court imposed multiple punishments for the same offense 
clearly presents a challenge to the legality of a particular sentence which may 
be addressed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 
P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An illegal sentence ... is one in excess of a 
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statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law."); State v. Pratt, 125 
Idaho 546, 553-560, 873 P.2d 800, 807-815 (1993) (double jeopardy claim 
analyzed pursuant to Pratt's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence 
presented to the district court); State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941,944 n.2, 71 P.3d 
1088, 1091 n.2 (Ct. App. 2003) (a double jeopardy challenge may be raised "by 
a motion under I.C.R. 35 to correct an illegal sentence."). Further, a claim of an 
illegal sentence may not be raised for the first time on appeal without the trial 
court having first had an opportunity to consider the legality of the terms of the 
sentence. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992) (court 
declined to consider claim of illegal sentence because defendant presented it for 
first time on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the record clearly 
demonstrated that sentence was illegal); State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 
808 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1991); State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 P.2d 
93, 96 (Ct. App. 1995); Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229, 832 P.2d at 1164. 
While Hubbard filed an I.C.R. 35 motion in this case, he did so only on 
the grounds of leniency. (R., pp.37, 45-49.) Because Hubbard did not raise the 
legality of his sentence by a way of an I.C.R. 35 motion below, thereby depriving 
the district court of the opportunity to correct any alleged error, Hubbard failed to 
preserve the issue for appellate review, and this Court must decline to address it 
absent a showing of fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 
P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (re-articulating Idaho fundamental error review standard.) 
In this case however, no fundamental error review is necessary because 
the policies implicated by the fundamental error doctrine are simply not present. 
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Most trial errors must be objected to before the district court and raised on direct 
appeal or a criminal defendant forfeits his opportunity to challenge the alleged 
error. The doctrine of fundamental error affords a defendant the right to 
appellate review that would otherwise not exist. However, I.C.R. 35 specifically 
provides an avenue for pursuing relief from an allegedly illegal sentence at any 
time, so if this Court declined to consider the issue, Hubbard would not be 
precluded from having his double jeopardy claim considered by the district court. 
Consistent with these policies, Idaho appellate courts have declined to perform 
fundamental error analysis where a defendant raises an illegal sentence claim 
for the first time on appeal. Lavy, 121 Idaho at 845, 828 P.2d at 874; Martin, 
119 Idaho at 578-79, 808 P.2d at 1323-24; Dorsey, 126 Idaho at 662, 889 P.2d 
at 96; Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229; 832 P.2d at 1164. The district court must 
be given an opportunity to correct its errors, after which Hubbard may appeal if 
he is not satisfied with the district court's decision. 
Hubbard appears to acknowledge that pre-Perry, he would have been 
required to raise his illegal sentence claim to the district court before raising it on 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7, n.1.) Hubbard recognizes that in State v. 
Lee, Docket No. 30542, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, (Idaho App. July 7, 
2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, considered an 
issue very similar to that raised in the present case. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8, 
n.1.) Citing the availability of relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35, the Court declined to 
review Lee's unpreserved multiple punishment double jeopardy claim. Lee, 
2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, pp.2-4. However, Hubbard correctly notes 
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2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, pp.2-4. However, Hubbard correctly notes 
that Lee does not constitute controlling precedent, and asserts that because Lee 
pre-dated Perry, the issue needs to be reconsidered utilizing the Idaho Supreme 
Court's new articulation of the fundamental error review standard. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-8, fn.1.) 
Perry, however, merely articulated a new standard with which to analyze 
fundamental error claims, it did not re-define the concept of fundamental error 
itself. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court sought to remedy confusion caused by 
"[m]ultiple statements of law pertaining to the fundamental error doctrine." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 219-200, 245 P.3d at 971-972. Perry did not grant 
defendants a new right to choose to bring their illegal sentence claims, which 
were not raised below and could still be raised pursuant to an I.C.R. 35 motion, 
for the first time on appeal. 
Because Hubbard failed to raise his double jeopardy claim below, and 
could still raise it as an illegal sentence claim pursuant to I.C.R. 35, this Court 
must decline to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. 
C. Even If This Court Analyzes Hubbard's Claim For Fundamental Error. 
Hubbard Has Failed To Establish Such Error 
Where a defendant does not object to the alleged error below, he has the 
burden of demonstrating fundamental error in order to obtain relief. Perry. 150 
Idaho at 219-226, 245 P.3d at 971-978. Should this Court analyze Hubbard's 
illegal sentence claim under the standard articulated in Perry, Hubbard must 
demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
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constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) demonstrate that 
the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it 
must have affected the outcome of the trial." lg_,_ at 226-228, 245 P.3d at 978-
980. Hubbard cannot meet his burden of showing either that his unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated, or that any such error plainly exists from the 
information contained in the appellate record. Therefore, Hubbard has failed to 
meet the first and second prongs of the Perry fundamental error test. 
First, Hubbard has failed to show that his unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated, or that his claim even implicates double jeopardy. Hubbard does 
not assert that the district court expressly imposed an additional punishment for 
his prior California conviction for which he had already been sentenced. 
Instead, Hubbard contends that the district court violated his double jeopardy 
rights by "essentially" punishing him for his prior crime by considering 
California's lenient prior sentence in its own sentencing analysis, and by 
focusing too heavily on Hubbard's underlying sex offense in sentencing him in 
the new failure to register case. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) While a district 
court may abuse its discretion by focusing too heavily on a prior conviction in 
imposing a sentence on a new crime, State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229, 
984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999), Hubbard has cited no case standing for the 
proposition that a sentencing court can violate a defendant's constitutional 
double jeopardy rights in this manner. Hubbard has therefore failed to show that 
7 
his claim implicates double jeopardy protections. 
Second, even if Hubbard could show that a sentencing court can violate a 
defendant's double jeopardy rights either by considering a prior court's lenient 
sentence or by focusing too heavily on conduct for which the defendant had 
already been sentenced, he cannot demonstrate any such error plainly existed 
in this case. At the sentencing hearing, it was Hubbard's counsel who brought 
up the issue of Hubbard's California lewd conduct conviction, and that 
conviction's relationship to the district court's sentencing decision on the new 
failure to register charge. Hubbard's counsel asserted that Hubbard would be 
extradited back to California, where he faced potential parole revocation and the 
likelihood of several years incarceration on the underlying sex offense. (Tr., 
p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.24.) It would be "unfair" to the Idaho taxpayers, Hubbard's 
counsel continued, for Hubbard to be imprisoned in Idaho in light of these 
pending criminal consequences in California. (Id.) Hubbard's counsel asked 
the district court to "let California handle this." (Tr., p.26, Ls.19-24.) Essentially, 
Hubbard's counsel was asking the court to impose a more lenient sentence as a 
result of his California lewd conduct conviction, and his pending criminal 
consequences in that case. 
The district court rejected Hubbard's argument. In so doing, the court 
appropriately considered Hubbard's failure to register as a sex offender, his prior 
criminal history, and his ongoing danger to the community: 
And there are consequences. In our society one of the only 
ways we feel comfortable having people like yourself out in the 
community is if they register so that everybody is on notice that 
they need to keep their children and their young girls away from 
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you. 
In this case I want to remind you that - you have a fairly 
significant criminal history. You have DUls, infliction of corporal 
injury on your spouse or co-habitant including multiple times, 
battery. And in this case you - in 2002 you were charged with four 
counts of L&L. Four. You pied to two. They gave you five years 
probation. This is the reason that I don't really listen to [Hubbard's 
counsel's] argument. 
I recognize what I'm going to do is going to cost the 
taxpayers here, but I suspect that the taxpayer would just as soon 
as pay the cost to make sure that you're locked up and not trust 
California to do what it's supposed to do. You have four L&L's, 
you pied to two, and they put you on five years probation. You 
were only on probation a short period of time when they had to 
revoke it. They then put you in prison. Then they put you back 
out. 
(Tr., p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.4.) 
Later, in response to Hubbard's comment to the presentence investigator 
that Hubbard was "shocked" that the state was recommending a ten year unified 
sentence (PSI, p.14), the district court reiterated, "[t]he failure to register [as a 
sex offender] is significant. As I told you, it's so that we make sure that people 
like you, other people are aware of." (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-19.) 
The district court did not punish Hubbard for his prior crimes for which he 
had already been sentenced, it rejected Hubbard's counsel's argument that the 
district court should impose a lesser sentence because of potential (though not 
necessarily inevitable)1, future criminal consequences in California. The district 
court was appropriately concerned with Hubbard's criminal history and the 
protection of the community. It did not expressly or otherwise indicate an intent 
1 The presentence investigator noted that Hubbard's assumption that he would 
be extradited to California to face prison time was not verified by any California 
authority at the time of the PSI report. (PSI, p.15.) 
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Hubbard may not rely on his own interpretations of the motives behind the 
court's sentencing analysis to demonstrate plain constitutional error. Hubbard 
has therefore failed to meet his burden to show plain error from the information 
available in the appellate record. 
Because Hubbard has failed to meet the first and second prongs of the 
Perry fundamental error analysis, he has failed to establish fundamental error. 
This Court must therefore affirm the district court's sentence. 
II. 
Hubbard Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion by "focusing 
intently and almost exclusively" on Hubbard's lewd conduct conviction for which 
he had already been sentenced. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) However, a 
review of the context of the district court's sentencing in this case reveals that 
while the sentencing court considered Hubbard's prior conduct, it did so properly 
in the context of considering Hubbard's ongoing danger to the community. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397,401 (2007); State v. Toohill, 103, Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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C. The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
It is well established that a sentencing court may properly consider a wide 
range of information in determining an appropriate sentence for a defendant. 
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229, 984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citations omitted). Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the sentencing court to 
consider a spectrum of evidence bearing upon the defendant's character, 
including the defendant's history of criminal offenses other than the one for 
which he appears at sentencing. kl However, a sentencing court may not go 
"beyond this authority and essentially impos[e] sentence for offenses other than 
the one that was before the court." kl 
In Findeisen, Findeisen was caught in the process of shoplifting from a 
Fred Meyer store and was charged and ultimately convicted of burglary. k!,. at 
228-229, 984 P.2d at 716-717. Several weeks after the incident, Findeisen went 
to the residence of the loss prevention officer who testified against him at the 
burglary preliminary hearing and attacked him with pepper spray. kl at 229, 
984 P.2d at 717. Several weeks after that, Findeisen returned to the loss 
prevention officer's residence and, while brandishing a shotgun and two 
handguns, forced the loss prevention officer to the floor, handcuffed him, duct-
taped his mouth, and shot him fourteen times with a pellet gun. kl Findeisen 
was convicted of kidnapping, intimidating a witness, and aggravated battery. Id. 
Findeisen was sentenced first on these three charges. Id. 
When Findeisen was later sentenced for the burglary charge in front of a 
different judge, the district court noted that the burglary, standing alone, was "a 
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relatively minor" and "fairly low-level" offense . .!slat 229-230, 984 P.2d at 717-
718. The district court described the attack on the loss prevention officer, 
however, as "a grievous wrong," and "one of the more appalling offenses that I 
have seen in over 15 years of being a judge." .!sl The court imposed the 
maximum ten year sentence for burglary, which it ran consecutive to the 
charges in the other case. & 
In vacating Findeisen's burglary sentence, The Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the "intensity of the trial court's focus on the other offenses," for which 
Findeisen had already been sentenced, constituted an abuse of discretion . .!sl 
The Court also noted that the prosecutor focused almost exclusively on the 
other offenses in his sentencing argument. !fl. 
While Hubbard attempts to compare his sentence with the vacated 
sentence in Findeisen (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15), the cases are easily 
distinguishable. Rather than downplay the significance of the case in front of it, 
the district court in the present case twice referenced the importance of the 
sexual offender registration requirement and its impact on the protection of 
society. (Tr., p.30, Ls.5-1 O; p.32, Ls.14-19.) While the district court did 
reference the leniency of California's sentence for the underlying lewd and 
lascivious conduct conviction, it did so, as discussed above, in response to 
Hubbard's argument that it should impose a lesser sentence in light of potential 
future consequences in California for absconding on his parole there. (Tr., p.25, 
L.23 - p.27, L.6; p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.4.) Further, while the prosecutor referenced 
Hubbard's criminal history, including his lewd and lascivious conduct conviction, 
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he also discussed Hubbard's ongoing risk to the community, lack of amenability 
to community supervision, and failure to register as a sex offender in Idaho. 
(Tr., p.22, L.1 - p.25, L.2.) 
While a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is unavoidably 
intertwined with its underlying sex offense2 in terms of a district court's 
sentencing analysis and application of the appropriate sentencing factors, the 
district court in this case simply did not discuss or analyze Hubbard's California 
lewd and lascivious conviction with the same intensity and exclusivity with which 
the district court in Findeisen discussed the cases associated with the attacks 
on the loss prevention officer. Instead, the district court's consideration of 
Hubbard's past conduct was necessary for it to determine, in light of Hubbard's 
failure to keep authorities properly notified of his whereabouts, the risk Hubbard 
posed to society and his potential for rehabilitation. It therefore did not abuse its 
sentencing discretion. 
Other factors in the district court's sentencing analysis further support the 
sentence imposed. The district court was appropriately concerned with 
Hubbard's prior criminal history. (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-19.) Hubbard was required to 
register as a sex offender because of his conviction for conducting a lewd and 
lascivious act upon his 12-year old stepdaughter. (PSI, pp.4-7, 57-76.) Several 
other lewd and lascivious charges were dismissed. (PSI, pp.3-7.) Hubbard 
2 In fact, this relationship between a conviction for failure to register as a sex 
offender and a prior conviction for the underlying sex offense is addressed in 
I.C. § 18-8311, the failure to register penalty statute. Idaho Code § 18-8311 (1) 
requires a sentencing court to revoke a defendant's current probation or parole, 
and to run the sentence for failure to register consecutively to the offender's 
underlying sex offense sentence. 
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violated his probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, and was 
eventually terminated from a sex offender treatment program. (PSI, pp.4-7, 17-
23.) Hubbard returned to prison for a time, but eventually was released again 
on parole. (PSI, pp.4-7.) Hubbard absconded from this parole when he traveled 
to Idaho. (PSI, pp.2-7.) Additionally, Hubbard has been the subject of three 
domestic violence investigations, with have resulted in two domestic violence 
charges and one conviction. (PSI, pp.3-6, 24-56.) While in prison, Hubbard 
was disciplined for "mutual combat [and] posession [sic] of inmate manufactured 
alcohol." (PSI, p.5.) 
The district court properly considered Hubbard's prior record and the 
appropriate sentencing factors in sentencing him. Hubbard has thus failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 10-year unified 
sentence with five years fixed upon his guilty plea to failure to register as a sex 
offender. 
111. 
Hubbard Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Failing To Redline Certain Portions Of His PSI 
A. Introduction 
Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to 
redline certain portions of his PSI. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Hubbard has 
failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
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B. Hubbard's Argument That The District Court Should Have Amended His 
PSI Is Not Preserved For Appeal 
As discussed above, "[i]t is a fundamental tenant of appellate law that a 
proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is 
preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. 
App. 2000). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho 
at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. 
The prior record section of Hubbard's presentence investigation report 
depicts entries for lewd and lascivious conduct in both 2002 and 2005. (PSI, 
pp.3-4.) The section entitled "Investigator's Comments and Analysis of 
Defendant's Condition" states that "[i]n 2002 and 2005, Mr. Hubbard was 
convicted of Lewd Conduct with children." (PSI, p.14.) However, in the prior 
record comments section, the PSI clarifies that Hubbard was convicted of lewd 
conduct in 2002, and that his probation was revoked and his sentence imposed 
on the same charge in 2005. (PSI, pp.5-7.) Thus, the 2005 entry in the prior 
record section did not depict a new conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct. 
In order to further clarify and correct this ambiguity, Hubbard submitted 
information regarding Hubbard's criminal history to the court, along with other 
requested PSI corrections. (PSI, pp.228-229; Tr., p.20, Ls.6-21.) The district 
court issued a "Sealed Order Correcting Information in Presentence Report," 
with Hubbard's corrections, and added it to the PSI. (PSI, pp.228-229.) At the 
sentencing hearing, in response to Hubbard's reference to his requested PSI 
corrections, the court stated, "Right. And I signed that and made that part of it." 
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(Tr., p.20, Ls.20-21.) Several weeks later, the presentence investigator 
submitted an addendum to the PSI which stated, "Appended is an Order 
Correcting Information in PSI. Corrections were made in PSI module. This is 
file information." (PSI, pp.230-233.) 
On appeal, Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion 
by merely attaching the corrections to the PSI, and not also "redlining" the 
clarifications and corrections in the body of the PSI itself. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-17.) Hubbard, however, has failed to preserve any claim that the district 
court's manner of amending the PSI constituted an abuse of discretion. At the 
sentencing hearing, the court informed Hubbard that it signed his list of 
corrections and added them to the PSI. (Tr., p.20, Ls.14-22.) Hubbard thanked 
the court and made no further objection to the contents of the PSI. (Tr., p.20, 
L.14 - p.21, L.15.) Further, Hubbard cannot show fundamental error pursuant 
to Perry because he has alleged no violation of his constitutional rights, nor has 
he identified any constitutional right to have his PSI corrected in any particular 
manner, much less a manner he did not request. 
Because Hubbard failed to preserve this claim, and because he cannot 
show fundamental error, this Court must decline to entertain this issue on 
appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Hubbard's sentence 
for failure to register as a sex offender. 
DATED this 28th day of August 2012 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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